The Constitutionality of the Security and Intelligence Agencies Bill 2025 and other matters: By Martin A.B.K. Amidu
THE PROLOGUE
The first Parliament that convened under the 1992 Constitution on 7 January 1993 was
composed of members of Parliament from the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the
National Convention Party (NCP) which contested the elections after the New Patriotic Party
(NPP) boycotted the December 1992 parliamentary election when it lost the November
presidential elections. Nonetheless, under the supervision of the late Captain (Rtd.) Kojo
Tsikata, who was the Presidential Advisor on National Security, the Government was
determined to enact Security and Intelligence Agencies legislation which would be in
conformity with Article 83 of the 1992 Constitution and be acceptable to succeeding political
parties and governments. The Security and Intelligence Agencies Bill, 1996 was accordingly
prepared by the Office of the Attorney-General under the supervision of Captain Tsikata with
assistance from the government of the United Kingdom. This writer was the lead participant
from the Office of the Attorney-General who saw the Security and Intelligence Agencies Bill,
1996 through Parliament to become the Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 1996 (Act 526)
on 31 December 1996 (after the 7 December 1996 elections). The Security and Intelligence
Agencies Act, 1993 (Act 526) became a pioneering law of its kind in Africa at the time as
Johnny Kwadjo discussed in his “Changing the Intelligence Dynamics in Africa: The Ghana
Experience” 2009. (See Kwadjo, J., 2009, ‘Changing the Intelligence Dynamics in Africa: The
Ghana Experience’, in Changing Intelligence Dynamics in Africa, eds. S. Africa and J. Kwadjo,
GFN-SSR and ASSN, Birmingham, UK, pp. 95-124).
The second NDC government under the 1992 Constitution designated and appointed a Minister
for National Security under Act 526 when it returned to office on 7 January 1997; the first and
second NPP governments also appointed a Minister for National Security in its second tenure;
the third and fourth NDC governments designated and appointed Ministers with responsibility
for Security and Intelligence while the third NPP government also designated and appointed a
Minister for National Security without needing to amend Act 526 before the Security and
Intelligence Agencies Act, 2020 (Act 1030) replaced it.
After over twenty-four years of the Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 1996 (Act 526)
being operationalized under alternating NDC and NPP governments, Act 526 was replaced by
a bi-partisan NPP and NDC Parliament with the Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 2020
(Act 1030) which substantially re-enacted the provisions of Act 526. Barely four years
thereafter the succeeding government intends by the Security and Intelligence Agencies Bill
2025 now laid before Parliament to re-enact another legislation as though every government
must own the security architecture it wishes to operate under while in power. How viable is
this mentality in a democracy under the regime of the rule of law and not of men?
INTRODUCTION
An examination and analysis of the Security and Intelligence Agencies Bill, 2025 leaves one
with the irresistible impression of an unconstitutional power grab for the National Security Co
ordinator and/or a fight for territory within a security architecture not derived from Article 83
of the 1992 Constitution as operationalized under the Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 1996 (Act 526) which had served this country and several democratically elected governments
well since 7 January 1993. Indeed, less than four years ago Parliament bi-partisanly re-enacted
the original Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 1996 (Act 526) as the Security and
Intelligence Agencies Act, 2020 (Act 1030) with additions which the operationalization of Act
526 over twenty-four years had disclosed needed to be upgraded to ensure the full attainment
of the constitutional objectives of democratic and civil control of the security and intelligence
apparatus of the nation.
I wish to assume that when Parliament considered the Security and Intelligence Agencies Bill
2020 that led to the enactment of the Security and Intelligence Act, 2020 (Act 1030) it was
satisfied that the Bill complied with Article 106(2)(a) of the 1992 Constitution. For the
avoidance of doubt, Article 106(2)(a) of the Constitution states that:
“No bill other than such a bill as is referred to in paragraph (a) of article 108 of this Constitution,
shall be introduced into Parliament unless- (a) it is accompanied by an explanatory
memorandum setting out in detail the policy and principles of the bill, the defects of the existing
law, the remedies proposed to deal with those defects and the necessity for its introduction;…”
(Emphasis supplied).
The first threshold hurdle the Security and Intelligence Agencies Bill, 2025 has to overcome
for Parliament to be seized with the power to accept it for consideration is to demonstrate
compliance with Article 106(2)(a) by the accompanying explanatory memorandum setting out
the policy and principles of the bill, the defects of Act 1030 as the existing law, the remedies
the bill proposes to deal with those defects and the necessity for the introduction of the bill to
Parliament. One cannot find in the explanatory memorandum accompanying the bill laid before
Parliament compliance with Article 106(2)(a) of the Constitution.
The explanatory memorandum accompanying the Security and Intelligence Agencies Bill,
2025 laid before Parliament is signed and dated 3 July 2025. The Government assumed office
on 7 January 2025 and in a letter from the President to Parliament, read by the Speaker during
a sitting on Friday, 7 March 2025, “the President assigned ministerial responsibility for national
security to the Minister of the Interior, Hon. Mohammed-Muntaka Mubarak.” The decision
was made pursuant to Section 64 of the Security and Intelligence Act, 2020 (Act 1030). Soon
thereafter preparation of the bill before Parliament started, approved by the Cabinet and
submitted to Parliament under the signature of the Minister for National Security.
In view of the fact that the government prepared and submitted this bill within six months of
assuming office it is imperative that the explanatory memorandum accompanying the bill
informs Parliament whether the existing Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 2020 (Act
1030) is tainted with any unconstitutionality or is fatally defective and the policy and principles
justifying the introduction of the bill to Parliament. This imperative of complying with Article
106(2)(a) of the Constitution is more urgent because part of the environment surrounding the
preparation and submission of the bill to Parliament is buttressed by the fact that after the new
government assumed office on 7 January 2025 one of the first acts of the President was to
appoint a still serving Assistant Commissioner of Police who was his Aide de Camp (ADC)
during his previous administration and tenure as the National Security Co-ordinator. The
National Security Co-ordiantor was then promoted to the rank of a Deputy Commissioner of
Police and again as a Commissioner of Police within the first six months of the President’s
administration. The foregoing environment within which the Security and Intelligence Agencies Bill, 2025 was
conceived and laid before Parliament within the first six months of the present government
provides background information and knowledge for assessing the attempt in the bill to give to
the Office of the National Security Co-ordinator and the Co-ordinator supraordinate powers
which the office never had under both Act 526 and the existing Act 1030.
ARTICLE 106(2)(a) OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SECURITY AND
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES BILL, 2025
The Security and Intelligence Agencies Bill 2025, even upon casual reading, is inconsistent
with and contravenes Article 106(2)(a) of the 1992 Constitution governing the mode of
exercising legislative power. Article 106 (2)(a) mandatorily demands that: “No bill other than
such a bill as is referred to in paragraph (a) of article 108 of this Constitution, shall be
introduced into Parliament unless- (a) it is accompanied by an explanatory memorandum
setting out in detail the policy and principles of the bill, the defects of the existing law, the
remedies proposed to deal with those defects and the necessity for its introduction;…”
Unfortunately, the explanatory memorandum accompanying the Security and Intelligence
Agencies Bill, 2025, failed to state in detail the policy and principles of the Bill and the
considerations underpinning the “current policy direction of government” to enable an
objective appraisal of the underlying government policy and principles alongside its
consistency with the constitutional architecture of the 1992 Constitution to ensure civil control
of all the security and intelligence apparatus of government including the Ghana Armed Forces
and the law enforcement institutions entrusted to a constitutionally and democratically elected
President as the repository of the executive power of Government.
Without a policy framework and principles located within the constitutional structure and
scheme of the 1992 Constitution, particularly, Article 83 thereof justifying and supporting “the
current policy direction of Government”, the self-serving statement in the memorandum
accompanying the Bill which states that: “The policy direction of government is to provide for
a security architecture where the National Security Co-ordinator co-ordinates the activities of
the security and intelligence agencies in the country” does not provide justification and
compliance with Article 106(2(a) of the Constitution for a sudden interference and
dismemberment of the Security and Intelligence architecture in Act 1030 established under
Article 83 of the 1992 Constitution.
The existing law was operationalized during the existence of the Constitution since 1996 when
the NDC Government enacted Act 526 to bring the operations of the Security and Intelligence
Agencies into conformity with the constitutional and democratic mandates of the Constitution,
particularly Article 83 thereof. Act 1030, which is substantially a re-enactment of Act 526 must,
therefore, be shown by the bill before Parliament to offend against the constitutional design,
structure, and scheme or to be defective as required under Article 106(2)(a) of the Constitution.
Consequently, it is important that whatever government policy and principles informs the need
for a completely new law to replace Act 1030 is expressly articulated to demonstrate the defect
in the existing legislation and/or any inconsistencies in its operationalization which necessitates
not just an amendment but a complete replacement of the Act. It is unconstitutional to introduce
a bill in Parliament just for the sake of providing for an anointed National Security Co-ordinator
whose office predates the 1992 Constitution and continued to exist and exercised functions
under Act 526 and 1030 for the sake of giving for the first time to such a person express supraordinate powers of coordinating “the activities of the Security and Intelligence Agencies
in the country.”
Both Act 526 and Act 1030 recognize the constitutional and democratic imperative of a
Minister of State being responsible for the Security and Intelligence Agencies and being
answerable to Parliament for those agencies. Any attempt, therefore, to dilute the powers of
the Minister responsible for Security and Intelligence Agencies by elevating the National
Security Co-ordinator to have for the first time by law supraordinate supervisory
responsibilities over the Security and Intelligence Agencies and thereby usurp the ministerial
functions of the Minister of State is a potential recipe for disaster and turf war between the
Minister, the National Security Co-ordinator, and the Directors-General of the Intelligence
Agencies. This is particularly so, when there are no clearly stated policy and principled
objectives or defects in the existing law anchored on any framework policy documentation for
the proposed changes.
The only impression an objective reader gets from the Bill is the fact that there has been a
change of government and consequently the President thinks that the structure of the current
security architecture established by his immediate predecessor President and Parliament must
be changed to enhance the powers or level of authority of the National Security Co-ordinator
whose office is not even mentioned in the scheme of Article 83 of the Constitution.
In the absence of any policy and principles underpinning the bill and the defects of the existing
law it seeks to cure one cannot overlook the environment surrounding the hasty introduction
of the bill in Parliament immediately the new government assumed office on 7 January 2025
where the National Security Co-ordinator appointed by the President as part of his first acts in
office on or about 15 January 2025 was an Assistant Commissioner of Police who served as
his official Aide de Camp (ADC) in his previous administration. The National Security Co
ordinator while still a serving officer in the Ghana Police Service has since been promoted to
the rank of Deputy Commissioner of Police and within a few months further promoted to the
rank of a Commissioner of Police within the first six months of the President’s administration.
Only time will tell whether this first in history serving Police officer and National Security Co
ordinator will soon not be additionally promoted the Inspector-General of Police (IGP) under
this government.
The foregoing environment within which the Security and Intelligence Agencies Bill, 2025 was
conceived and laid before Parliament within the first six months of the present government,
therefore, provides the background information and knowledge for assessing the attempt in the
bill to give to the Office of the National Security Co-ordinator and the Co-ordinator
supraordinate powers which the office never had under both Act 526 and the existing Act 1030.
The Objective and Purpose of the Security and Intelligence Agency Bill, 2025
The objective and purpose of the bill are stated in the first six opening paragraphs of the
accompanying explanatory memorandum to the Bill. Stripped of all pretentions and form, the
substantive objective is to make provisions for the establishment of an “Office of the National
Security Co-ordinator to coordinate activities of the security agencies responsible for national
security” allegedly “in order to protect and preserve the unity and stability of the State….”
The second paragraph of the Memorandum to the Bill recognizes the fact that the Security and
Intelligence Agencies Act, 1996 (Act 526) was repealed after over twenty-four years by the Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 2020 (Act 1030) which has been in existence for four
years after its operationalization. The purpose of the Bill is simply stated as “the need to re
enact Act 1030 to reflect the current policy direction of Government.”
The third paragraph of the Memorandum accompanying the Bill states the policy direction of
the Government as follows: “The policy direction of Government is to provide for a security
architecture where the National Security Co-ordinator co-ordinates the activities of the security
and intelligence agencies in the country. The Bill envisages that the National Security Council,
which is chaired by the President, will work directly with the Office of the National Security
Co-ordinator and the Directors-General of the intelligence agencies.”
The explanatory memorandum accompanying the Security and Intelligence Agencies Bill,
2025 makes no attempt whatsoever in the six paragraphs stating the objective and purpose of
the bill or in any other paragraphs of the memorandum to set “…. out in detail the policy and
principles of the bill, the defects of the existing law, the remedies proposed to deal with those
defects and the necessity for its introduction” in Parliament as mandatorily demanded by the
Constitution. The purpose of the Bill which is simply stated as “the need to re-enact Act 1030
to reflect the current policy direction of Government” is insufficient to satisfy the constitutional
requirement of providing in the explanatory memorandum the detailed policy and principles of
the bill. Similarly, the statement in the third paragraph of the explanatory memorandum stating
that: “The policy direction of Government is to provide for a security architecture where the
National Security Co-ordinator co-ordinates the activities of the security and intelligence
agencies in the country” is insufficient without setting out in detail the policy and principles of
the bill and the defects in the existing law warranting “the need to re-enact Act 1030 to reflect
the current policy direction of Government.”.
The further justification for the Bill which states that: ‘The Bill envisages that the National
Security Council, which is chaired by the President, will work directly with the Office of the
National Security Co-ordinator and the Directors-General of the intelligence agencies” only
wittingly or unwittingly goes to confirm that what the Security and Intelligence Agencies Bill,
2025 seeks to do is to enthrone the President’s former ADC whom he has appointed the
National Security Co-ordinator as Lord and Master over the Minister responsible for National
Security, and over the intelligence agencies.
This is a dangerous whimsical basis for changing existing laws without complying with Article
106(2) of the Constitution even if the government has the numbers in parliament to achieve its
objective. The next government will for a similar reason repeal and enact its own whimsical
alternative Security and Intelligence Agencies law. Act 526 would not have survived for a
quarter of a century if the NPP had viewed Act 526 as a partisan piece of legislation enacted
by an NDC government when the NPP was not represented in Parliament in 1996.
Without underscoring the fact that Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 2020 (Act 1030)
re-enacted most of the provisions of the Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 1996 (Act
526) with additions to take care of policy deficits revealed or disclosed by its operationalization
over those twenty-four years, the Security and Intelligence Agencies Bill, 2025 simply states
that: “Four years after the operationalization of Act 1030, there is the need to re-enact Act 1030
to reflect the current policy direction of Government.” Must Ghana have a new security
architecture enshrined in legislation every four years when there is a change of government as
a policy objective when no defects in the existing law has been demonstrated as mandated by
Article 106(2) of the 1992 Constitution?Office of the National Security Co-ordinator as a Supraordinate Intelligence Agency
The Security and Intelligence Agencies Bill 2025 seeks to convert the Secretariat of the
National Security Council and its Co-ordinator whose existence predates the 1992 Constitution
into a supraordinate intelligence agency for the first time in the history of this country under
Clauses 12 (a), 14 (1), 15, 17(1(f), and 19(e) of the Bill with the National Security Co-ordinator
as the head. Clause 15, for instance, spelling out the new functions of the supraordinate
National Security Co-ordinator subjugates the constitutionally recognized intelligence agencies
under Article 83 and their briefing authorities of the President as reserved only for the National
Security Co-ordinator. All the other Clauses of the Bill substantially re-enact Act 526 as
upgraded by Act 1030.
The extent of the enormous power grab for the President’s former Aid de Camp as the National
Security Co-ordinator can be gleaned from a comparison of Sections 18, 19, and 20 of Act 526,
Sections 20, 21, 22, and 23 of Act 1030, with Clauses 14, 15, and 16 of the Security and
Intelligence Agencies Bill 2025. The situation is worsened by the fact that whilst the Bill
purports to establish the Office of the National Security Co-ordinator as an intelligence agency
alongside the existing two intelligence agencies, the National Security Co-ordinator, unlike the
Directors-General of the Intelligence Agencies, is not enjoined to “pursue and ensure political
party neutrality…” of the Office of the National Security Co-ordinator in the performance of
its functions. (See Sections 14(c) of Act 526 and Section 16(c) of Act 1030 and contrast that
with Clauses 15 and 19(c) of the 2025 Bill on the functions of the Co-ordinators and the
Directors-General of the Intelligence Agencies respectively).
Whatever unarticulated policy and principles underpinned the Bill, the substantive changes the
Bill seeks to make to the existing law, Act 1030, are to simply create a monopoly for, and a
form of dictatorship of the National Security Co-ordinator over the Directors of Internal and
External Intelligence contrary to the letter and spirit of the entrenched provision of Article 83
of the 1992 Constitution. Article 83(1) states that: “There shall be a National Security Council
which shall consist of – (g) the Director of External Intelligence; (h) the Director of Internal
Intelligence; … and (k) three persons appointed by the President.” The offices of “(g) the
Director of External Intelligence; (h) the Director of Internal Intelligence” predated the 1992
Constitution as was the office of National Security Co-ordinator when the framers of the
Constitution purposefully excluded the latter from membership of the National Security
Council.
There is, therefore, everything constitutionally wrong with any Bill that seeks to establish a
supraordinate intelligence agency by legislation and elevating its head, a non-recognized
constitutional member of the National Security Council, over expressly named constitutional
members of the National Security Council. Article 83 is an entrenched provision of the
Constitution which can only be amended after a national referendum and no President and
Parliament have the power to dilute the powers of members of the Council designed by the
Constitution by elevating any preferred appointee over them by means of legislation.
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ACT 526, ACT 1030, AND THE 2025 BILL
The Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 1996 (Act 526) dealt with ministerial
responsibility for intelligence agencies under Section 17 by stating that the President shall
assign ministerial responsibilities of the intelligence agencies to the Minister whom the President considers appropriate. This was because Article 78 is the empowering provision for
the appointment of Ministers of State. Act 526 did not make any provisions for the functions
of the Minister in the legislation nor for a Ministry for the Security and Intelligence Agencies
because the establishment of Ministries for specific subject matters and the Chief Director for
the Ministry are governed by the Civil Service Act, 1993 (P.N.D.C.L. 327) pursuant to which
each President made an instrument establishing the Ministries under his administration. There
was also no express provision made for a Ministerial Co-ordinating Committee of the National
Security Council as this was permissible under Section 10 of Act 526 empowering the National
Security Council to establish committees of the Council consisting of Members of the Council
or non members or both to perform a function of the Council.
The Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 2020 (Act 1030) chose to expressly provide for a
Ministerial Security Co-ordinating Committee of the Council in Section 11 despite the fact that
the preceding Section 10 made it permissive if the Council so decided. Act 1030 also made
express provision for the appointment of a Deputy National Security Co-ordinator in Section
22. And then, under the sub heading of Responsibilities and Roles for National Security it
provided for the functions of the Minister in Section 24, and functions of the Chief Director in
Section 25. Sections 24 and 25 of Act 1030 were reinforced with the provisions of Sections 39
and 40 giving the Minister power over accounts and audits including submitting the accounts
of the Council to the Auditor-General, and the submission of the annual reports and other
reports to Parliament, respectively. Sections 17 and 33 of Act 526 had vested account keeping
and audit functions in the Co-ordinator to the Council and the annual reporting function to
Parliament in the Minister.
It is instructive that Section 24 of Act 1030 recognizes that it was not the place of the Act to
prescribe the functions of Ministers of State when the opening words of the section began thus:
“Without limiting the functions specified in the Civil Service Act, 1993 (P.N.D.C.L. 327) and
any other enactment, the Minister shall perform the following functions:..” Section 24 of Act
1030 is conditioned upon whether the President in exercise of his authority to appoint Ministers
of State under Article 78 of the Constitution chooses to designate one as Minister for National
Security. It is also instructive that Section 25 of Act 1030 on the functions of the Chief Director
also recognized that it was not the place of the Act to prescribe the function of the Chief
Director when the opening words of the section also began by stating that: “Without limiting
the functions specified under section 15 of the Civil Service Act, 1992 (PNDCL 327) or any
other enactment, the Chief Director of the Ministry shall perform the following functions…”.
Consequently, upon the change of government on 7 January 2025 following the 7 December
2024 elections, the President in the execution of his executive functions grounded under the
Civil Service Act, 1993 (Act 327) established by Executive Instrument the number of
Ministries of State for the administration of the country under his regime. It is for this reason
that on 9 January 2025 President John Dramani Mahama exercised his authority under Act 327
to establish only twenty-three (23) Ministries of State for the administration of Ghana by
signing the Civil Service (Ministries) Instrument, 2025 (E.I. 1). E.I 1 of 2025 disestablished
the Ministry of National Security by not including such a Ministry in the list of sector
ministries. Thereafter, Sections 25 and 24 of Act 1030 automatically fell into desuetude or
became dormant provisions and the Head of Civil Service was enjoined to recall any Chief
Director appointed under Section 25 of Act 1030. A future government may revive those
provisions by a new Civil Service (Ministries) Instrument, if it so wished.The Security and Intelligence Agencies Bill, 2025 virtually reinstates section 17 of Act 526 as
its Clause 11 of the Bill and omits Sections 11, 22, 24 and 25 of Act 1030 on a Ministerial
Security Co-ordinating Committee of the Council, the appointment of a Deputy National
Security Co-ordinator, the functions of the Minister, and the functions of the Chief Director
respectively without offering any detailed explanation for doing so or the defects disclosed in
the application of those provisions. The Bill laid before Parliament also transfers the powers of
the Minister over accounts and audit in Section 39 of Act 1030 to the National Security Co
ordinator and the annual reporting function in section 40 to the Minister.
An examination of Act 526 and Act 1030 alongside the Security and Intelligence Agencies Bill
2025 now laid before Parliament suggest that the substantive reasons for the introduction of
this Bill to replace the existing Act 1030 is the fact that this Government disagrees with the
provisions made by the 7th Government and Parliament under Sections 11, 22, 24, 25, 39 and
40 of Act 1030 on a Ministerial Security Co-ordinating Committee of the Council, the
appointment of a Deputy National Security Co-ordinator, the functions of the Minister, and the
functions of the Chief Director, vesting in the Minister authority over accounts and audit, and
annual reporting to Parliament respectively.
The only substantive additions introduced by the bill now before Parliament is the
enthronement of the Office of the National Security Co-ordinator and the National Security
Co-ordinator as a supraordinate national security agency. The Bill does this by elevating and
enhancing the status and powers of the Office of the National Security Co-ordinator and its Co
ordinator over the Security and Intelligence Agencies and any Minister assigned responsibility
for the Security and Intelligence Agencies in clauses 12(a), 15(c), 17(f), and 19(e), dealing with
the Office of the National Security Co-ordinator as one of the intelligence agencies, the
functions of the Co-ordinator to provide appropriate orientation and general guidance to the
intelligence agencies, enjoining the internal and external intelligence agencies to perform any
other functions directed by the Co-ordinator, and enjoining the Directors-General to perform
any other functions directed by the Co-ordinator.
In sum, the functions of the Minister and the Chief Director under Sections 24, 25, and 39 of
Act 1030 are being repealed and transferred to the supraordinate new Office of the National
Security Co-ordinator and the Co-ordinator instead of even the Minister with responsibility for
National Security being established again in Clause 11 thereof. The Bill seeks to entrench the
supraordinate position of the National Security Co-ordinator for the first time by subjugating
the Directors of Internal and External Intelligence to his express control in clauses 15(c), 17(f),
and 19(e), of the Bill in giving him the functions to provide appropriate orientation and general
guidance to the intelligence agencies, enjoining the internal and external intelligence agencies
to perform any other functions directed by the Co-ordinator, and enjoining the Directors
General to perform any other functions directed by the Co-ordinator
The Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 1996 (Act 526) and the Security and Intelligence
Agencies Act, 2020 (Act 1030) never created the Office of the National Security Co-ordinator
and the Co-ordinator as a Supraordinate intelligence agency over and above the internal and
external intelligence agencies for a simple reason. Article 83(1)(g) and (h) expressly made the
Directors of the Internal and External Intelligence members of the National Security Council
as a matter of right. This is an entrenched provision of the Constitution that can only be
amended through a referendum. Even though the Office of National Security Co-ordinator predated the 1992 Constitution the
framers of the constitution never made the National Security Co-ordinator a member of the
National Security Council. As a matter of the personal knowledge of this writer, at the time of
enacting the Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 1996 (Act 526) it would have been
inconsistent with and in contravention of the Constitution to elevate the Co-ordinator above
the Directors of the Internal and External Intelligence by legislation in the teeth of Article 83(g)
and (h) by requiring members of the Council to take directives from a non-member of the
Council instead of directly from the President or the Council. I believe that it was for the same
reason that Parliament did not create the Office of the National Security Co-ordinator and the
Co-ordinator as a supraordinate intelligence agency over and above the internal and external
intelligence agencies in Act 1030.
In view of the fact that the Security and Intelligence Agencies Bill 2025 exhibits an intention
to repeal Sections 24 and 25 of Act 1030 and enthrone the Office of the National Security Co
ordinator and the Co-ordinator as a supraordinate intelligence agency over and above the
internal and external intelligence agencies under clauses 15(c), 17(f) and 19(e) of the Bill the
memorandum accompanying the Security and Intelligence Agencies Bill 2025 should in
accordance with Article 106(2)(a) of the Constitution mandatorily set out in detail the policy
and principles justifying the bill to replace the existing Act 1030 anchored on any alleged
unconstitutionalities and other defects in the Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 2020 (Act
1030), and the remedies proposed to deal with the unconstitutionalities or defects alleged as
necessitating the introduction of the Bill in Parliament to replace the existing Act 1030.
The Bill as presently laid before Parliament has failed to comply with the mandatory provisions
of Article 106 (2)(a) for it to be introduced in Parliament for its acceptance and consideration.
It follows, therefore, that the Bill before this Committee is incompetent as having failed to
comply with Article 106(a) notwithstanding the fact that it was gazetted under Article 106(2)(b)
thereof.
OBSERVATIONS
Regional and District Security Councils
The Security and Intelligence Agencies Bill before Parliament seeks to expand the composition
of the Regional and District Security Councils contained in the existing Act 1030 without
setting out the defects in the existing law which gives the Regional Minister and the District
Chief Executive authority to demand security briefs from the heads of the agencies being added
to the list of membership of those councils. It is as though more jobs and allowances are being
created by the government for the “boys” from the public purse.
The Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 1996 (At 526) established Regional and District
Security Councils, their composition, and functions under Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof.
The succeeding Act 1030 which replaced Act 526 substantially re-enacted the provisions under
Act 526 on the Regional and District Security Councils in Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of Act
1030 with the addition of the Regional and District Directors of the National Disaster
Management Organization as a member of the Regional Security Council and District Security
Councils respectively. The Security and Intelligence Agencies Bill, 2025 needlessly expands
the composition of the Regional and District Security Councils to include the regional and
district officers in charge of the Narcotics Control Commission, the National Identification
Authority, the National Ambulance Service, three members of Parliament from the region and one member of Parliament from the district nominated by the Regional Minister and the District
Chief Executive respectively. Can it seriously be agreed that the Regional and District
Directors of Health Services, Agriculture, Information Services Department, and many others
do not perform security related functions?
The Regional and District Security Councils were intended to replicate the composition of the
National Security Council set forth in Article 83 of the Constitution at the regional and district
levels instead of providing avenues for generating further benefits and allowances from the
public purse for selected “boys” without any explanation of the necessity for including them in
the Bill.
Negation of the constitutional rights of members of the National Security Council in the
Bill
The Bill also seeks to unconstitutionally negate the effect of Article 83 of the Constitution that
allows the Members of the National Security Council which includes the Directors-General of
the External and Internal Agencies (Article 83 (g) and (h)) thereof), and the responsible
Ministers, (Article 83(c) thereof) to be capable as of right of briefing the Council and sharing
ideas to enhance the security of the state. The Security and Intelligence Agencies Bill 2025 by
enthroning the Office of the National Security Co-ordinator and the Co-ordinator as a
supraordinate intelligence agency over and above the internal and external intelligence
agencies under clauses 15©, 17(f) and 19(e) purports to subjugate members of the National
Security Council to the Office of the National Security Co-ordinator and the Co-ordinator.
This is clearly inconsistent with and contravenes the letter and the spirit of the 1992
Constitution and is void ab initio. One may ask why the intelligence agency named in Article
83(l) as “the Director of Military Intelligence” has also not been subjugated to the National
Security Co-ordinator?
Discretion of the President to appoint other persons to the National Security Council
The Bill before Parliament also seeks to entice the President in exercising his discretion to
appoint three other members to the Council to have regard to the Ghana Immigration Service,
the Ghana National Fire Service and gender balance as members of the National Security
Council established under Article 83(1)(k). The three persons who the President appoints as
members of the Council pursuant to Article 83(1)(k) of the Constitution is matter entirely
within the President’s discretion and the attempt in Clause 1(2) of the Bill to circumscribe the
President’s discretion is inconsistent with and contravenes the Constitution.
CONCLUSIONS
This memorandum to Parliament demonstrates that without an explanatory memorandum
setting out in detail the policy and principles of the bill, the defects of the existing law, the
remedies proposed to deal with those defects and the necessity for its introduction
accompanying the Security and Intelligence Agencies Bill 2025 that was laid before Parliament
and referred to the Intelligence Committee of Parliament any further action on the bill to
enacted it into legislation would be a violation of Article 106(2)(a) of the 1992 Constitution.
The foregoing discourse contained in the memorandum also shows that it is not the place of
Parliament to enact legislation for the purpose of granting powers as reward for services previously rendered to elected Presidents or any other persons elected under the 1992
Constitution. It has been contended that for the first time in the history of this country the
Security and Intelligence Agencies Bill 2025 seeks to elevate the person occupying the Office
of the National Security Co-ordinator over and above constitutionally recognized members of
the National Security Council using the instrumentality of legislation without demonstrating
any defects in the existing law warranting such grab of powers for the family, friends and
cronies of the President.
The duty of Parliament and of every patriotic Ghanaian is to assist the President to exercise the
executive power vested in him in accordance with his oath of office without fear or favour,
affection or ill will and not to mislead the President to resort to acts that partake of breaches of
his constitutional duties by actions that may be interpretated as favouring family, friends, and
cronies of the President.
It is for these reasons that I submit this memorandum to Parliament in the hope that Parliament
will be bold to assert its powers as a check on the executive arm of government when the
provisions of the 1992 Constitution are threatened with non-compliance. The Parliamentary
Committee on Security and Intelligence should, therefore, return the Security and Intelligence
Bill, 2025 back to the plenary of Parliament with the recommendation that it failed to meet the
threshold provisions of Article 106(2)(a) of the Constitution to give Parliament the power to
consider and enact it into law.
Sycophancy breeds autocracy which slowly erodes democracy and the rule of law, and
eventually kills democracy. That is how democracies die! Parliament must, therefore, never be
seen to be on the leash by the Executive arm of government in its law making functions under
Article 106 of the 1992 Constitution.
Submitted please.
Martin A. B. K. Amidu
